Zhang Junping, Tang Runjia
Abstract: Wang Yangming’s Philosophy of the Mind and Henry David Thoreau’s Transcendentalist Philosophy are rooted in distinctly different cultural contexts and ideological lineages. Existing academic studies mostly focus on the respective ontological constructions, historical development trajectories, and intellectual influences of these two ideological systems. However, few studies have examined the theoretical convergences between them in the core concept of “innate conscience”—particularly the lack of exploration into their similarities in three key aspects: “affirming the a priori nature of the inherent moral origin,” “criticizing the constraints imposed by external dogmas and authorities,” and “emphasizing the subjectivity of moral practice.” Despite significant philosophical divergences in their conceptions of “innate conscience” regarding metaphysical foundations, methodologies of moral practice, and the boundaries of their engagement with society, both represent a profound reaction against external authorities and dogmas. Moreover, both shift the ultimate source of moral truth from external norms to the individual’s inner mind, thereby constructing a systematic paradigm of moral practice. In light of this, this paper takes the conception of “innate conscience” as the core comparative dimension, adopts cross-cultural comparative research methods, and systematically analyzes the commonalities and differences between the two in three aspects: ideological connotation (the definition of the nature of moral origin), practical path (the specific way of moral realization), and value orientation (the ultimate goal of moral pursuit), aiming to provide a new theoretical perspective for cross-cultural intellectual dialogue.
Keywords: innate conscience; Wang Yangming; Henry David Thoreau; comparative study
1. Introduction
In the mid-Ming China (15th to 16th centuries), Neo-Confucianism—particularly the orthodox Zhu Xi school—became rigid, leaving intellectuals trapped in moral nihilism and a disconnect between knowledge and action. Against this backdrop, Wang Yangming (1472–1529) developed the Philosophy of the Mind, proposing the core doctrines of “extending innate conscience” (zhi liang zhi) and “the unity of knowledge and action” (zhi xing he yi), attempting to internalize moral ontology within the mind and rebuild individual subjectivity. Almost three centuries later, in 19th-century America, Henry David Thoreau (1807–1862), a representative figure of the Transcendentalist movement, similarly launched a fierce critique of the prevalent materialism and blind conformity in society, advocating that life and actions should be guided by the individual’s inner conscience.
Although Wang Yangming’s Philosophy of the Mind and Thoreau’s Transcendentalist Philosophy are geographically and temporally distant, rooted in vastly different cultural contexts and ideological lineages, both represent a profound reaction against external authorities and dogmas. Furthermore, both shift the ultimate source of moral truth from external norms to the individual’s inner mind, constructing a systematic paradigm of moral practice. Existing academic studies mostly focus on the respective ontological constructions, historical development trajectories, and intellectual influences of these two ideological systems. Few studies, however, have explored the theoretical convergences between them in the core concept of “innate conscience”—especially their similarities in three key aspects: “affirming the a priori nature of the inherent moral origin,” “criticizing the restrictive nature of external dogmas and authorities,” and “emphasizing the subjectivity of moral practice.” In light of this, this paper takes the conception of “innate conscience” as the core comparative dimension, adopts cross-cultural comparative research methods, and systematically analyzes the commonalities and differences between the two in three aspects: ideological connotation (the definition of the nature of moral origin), practical path (the specific way of moral realization), and value orientation (the ultimate goal of moral pursuit), aiming to provide a new theoretical perspective for cross-cultural intellectual dialogue.
2. Wang Yangming’s Conception of “Innate Conscience”
Wang Yangming’s philosophical system of the Mind is built upon a subversive reconstruction of orthodox Neo-Confucianism, centering on the ontological status of innate conscience and the practical principle of “the unity of knowledge and action.” His conception of innate conscience is systematic and rigorous: derived from Mencius’ theory of the innate goodness of human nature, it draws on Lu Jiuyuan’s idea that “the mind itself is the universal principle” (xin ji li), Cheng Yi’s notion that “the original nature of man is the embodiment of the universal principle” (xing ji li), Zhu Xi’s theory of order, and the concept of change from the I Ching Commentary, proposing that “Nothing exists apart from the mind; no activity occurs apart from the mind; and no principle resides apart from the mind.” (Wang 179) and “The substance is the substance of innate conscience; the function is the function of innate conscience. How can there be anything transcending substance and function?” (Wang 63). Additionally, drawing on Daoist theories of origin, Confucian doctrines of innate conscience as the original mind, and Chinese Buddhist theories of inherent mind-awareness, Wang Yangming arrived at the view that innate conscience and all things in heaven and earth are interconnected through a single vital energy (qi). In terms of “the substance of innate conscience” and “extending innate conscience,” he grounded his thought in Confucianism while integrating elements from Buddhism and Daoism (He 120–126). His ideological system is interwoven with concepts such as innate conscience as inner knowing, self-knowledge, self-awareness, a single thought, and non-knowing, highlighting the importance of self-knowledge of innate conscience (Wu 11–22).
Wang Yangming’s definition of “innate conscience” encompasses four connotations. First, “innate conscience” is the moral ontology. “The mind is the master of the body. The mind’s ‘void, spiritual, bright, and conscious’ quality (xu ling ming jue) is what is called the original ‘Innate Conscience’ (Liangzhi).” (Wang 103)Wang’s reference to “emptiness, spirituality, clarity, and awareness” indicates that innate conscience is the clear perception of heavenly principle (tian li), and that innate conscience is the subject of virtue. He further states, “Innate conscience is the substance of the mind, which is what I previously referred to as the constant illumination” (Wang 113). The reason why “innate conscience” constitutes the moral ontology is that it possesses the virtue of supreme goodness—innate conscience is “the nature bestowed by heaven, pure and supremely good.” (Wang 244)All goodness or virtue originates from innate conscience: “For innate conscience is simply the place where the natural clarity and manifestation of heavenly principle reside; it is nothing but sincere compassion, which is its substance. Therefore, extending this sincere compassion of innate conscience to serve one’s parents is filial piety; extending it to respect one’s elder brothers is fraternity; extending it to serve one’s ruler is loyalty—all are but a single innate conscience.” (Wang 129) Second, “innate conscience” is the measure and standard of “heavenly principle.” In Wang’s view, as the “substance of virtue,” the supremely good innate conscience represents the manifest state of heavenly principle and human morality, serving as the ethical criterion for judging right and wrong, good and evil, and the ultimate standard for verifying “heavenly principle.” He asserts, “in the original substance of the mind there is no distinction between good and evil. When the will is in motion, the distinction between good and evil arises. To know what is good and what is evil is the work of innate conscience. To do good and eliminate evil is “the investigation of things (ge wu).” (Wang 153) In other words, innate conscience is the “mind of right and wrong,” the foundation of morality, and the criterion for distinguishing good from evil. Third, Wang Yangming points out, “the state of equilibrium before the emotions are aroused (wei fa zhi zhong) is precisely the Innate Conscience (liang zhi); it is a seamless, undifferentiated whole that knows no distinction between before and after, or internal and external” (Wang 115), which clarifies that innate conscience is independent of acquired learning or external experience. When not obscured by selfish desires or applied to specific matters, it is inherently pure and unbiased, consistent with the state of “great foundation” where emotions are unaroused and the mind is clear. Fourth, innate conscience is the concrete and subtle of the universe, the ontology of all things in the cosmos. As Wang Yangming puts it, “innate conscience is the creative spirit of the universe. The creation of heaven and earth, and the manifestation of ghosts and gods, all proceed from it.” (Wang 144)
Wang Yangming’s concept of innate conscience evolved through three stages: in the early stage, innate conscience was ethically oriented—encompassing the mind of filial piety, fraternity, and compassion—and his understanding of “the way of the sage” primarily centered on human relationships rooted in filial piety and fraternity; in the second stage, innate conscience was defined as the “mind of right and wrong,” which was first and foremost a moral concept of distinguishing right from wrong, while also encompassing wisdom. Innate conscience served both as the basis for moral judgment and the motivation for moral practice. In the third stage, innate conscience was “supreme goodness”—the eternally perfect substance of innate conscience, elevated to a cosmic-level spiritual clarity that could interact and flow with all things (Geng 344). In summary, Wang Yangming defined innate conscience as the substance of the mind, the clear moral ontology, the mind that judges right, wrong, good, evil, truth, and falsity, the subtle manifestation of the cosmos, and the ontology of all things. Essentially, innate conscience is an intuitive moral judgment. This endowed Confucian ethics with a strong ontological foundation: morality is no longer an external set of rules but an inherent mode of operation of the cosmic ontology (heavenly principle). Therefore, the ultimate goal of moral practice is “to stop at this, to restore its inherent nature,” that is, to recover the original state of supreme goodness of the mind.
“Extending innate conscience” (zhi liang zhi) represents the mature form of Wang Yangming’s Philosophy of the Mind. What does “extending” (zhi) mean? “Extending” denotes action, “attaining the utmost,” and carries the connotation of “expansion” (Huang and Zhao 889–892). What, then, is “extending innate conscience”? First, it involves integrating innate conscience with acquired practice, emphasizing the achievement of moral self-awareness and the unity of knowledge and practice through “the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge” (ge wu zhi zhi) and “the unity of knowledge and action” (Fang 51–68, 308). Second, “extending innate conscience” is also an existential theory that begins with the obstruction of innate conscience, with its core being the removal of “barriers” to ensure that innate conscience permeates all aspects of an individual’s conduct. In brief, “extending innate conscience” requires two things: first, expanding one’s inherent mind, eliminating the selfish desires that obscure innate conscience, and allowing the innate conscience of the mind to operate unimpeded, pervading heaven and earth; second, acting in accordance with innate conscience. Wang Yangming explicitly stated: “What I mean by the unity of knowledge and action is precisely to make people understand that the moment a thought arises, it is already action. If an evil thought arises, we must conquer and eliminate that evil thought, root and branch, not allowing a single evil thought to lurk in the mind—this is the purpose of my teaching.” (Wang 138) Thus, extending knowledge necessarily lies in action; without action, there can be no true extension of knowledge, and acting in accordance with knowledge is the essence of extending knowledge. Only by eliminating all selfish desires in the mind can the inherent substance of innate conscience be revealed, thereby regulating one’s thoughts and actions and embodying moral value.
Furthermore, how can one “extend innate conscience” and achieve the unity of knowledge and action? First is preserving and nourishing, and dwelling in reverence. “Preserving and nourishing” refers to preserving and nourishing heavenly principle. Since heavenly principle resides in the mind, preserving and nourishing heavenly principle means “preserving and nourishing the heavenly principle within the mind.” (Wang 93) The practice is “dwelling in reverence” (ju jing), that is, directing one’s entire mind to the cultivation of heavenly principle. Second is reflecting and examining, and conquering and governing. Reflecting and examining involves self-introspection, returning to sincerity; conquering and governing involves overcoming oneself, constantly reflecting on one’s thoughts and actions, detecting whether selfish desires are obscuring heavenly principle, and ultimately achieving a state where the mind is purely aligned with heavenly principle. Third, “tempering oneself in affairs.” “One must temper oneself in affairs to stand firm, to be calm and stable both in stillness and in movement” (Wang 78–79), requiring individuals to face the interference of selfish desires directly in the course of handling affairs—such as interacting with others, solving problems, and practicing morality—and to align the mind with heavenly principle through repeated “tempering.” This methodology endows the practice of the Philosophy of the Mind with structure and applicability. Among these, “sincere intention” (cheng yi) is the key practice, encompassing two dimensions: “learning within the mind” and “tempering in affairs,” ultimately achieving the state of “each thing being returned to its proper place” where truth is realized, representing the self-clarity of subjectivity (Dong 66–73). Its purpose is to eliminate evil, embrace goodness, and cultivate virtue to become a sage. It is evident that Wang Yangming’s “unity of knowledge and action” is not merely a moral epistemology but also a practical ethic.
3. Thoreau’s Conception of “Innate Conscience”
Thoreau’s thought is closely linked to that of Ralph Waldo Emerson, the central figure of American Transcendentalism, as Thoreau inherited Emerson’s ontology centered on “the Over-Soul”. For Emerson, “the Over-Soul” is a spiritual unity and divine existence transcending individual existence, connecting all life and harmonizing with the cosmos as a whole; humans naturally establish “an original relation to the universe” (Emerson, The Complete Essays, 412). This thought locates the source of human morality in a transcendental, a priori capacity for freedom, making absolute trust in conscience the core of Transcendentalist practice. Meanwhile, Emerson argued that nature contains the ultimate truths of the universe and possesses divine power: “Nature is a substance existing independently of the mind” and “a form of revelation for the human mind” (Emerson, Nature, 43). Humans can attain spiritual enlightenment through direct communication with nature. In Nature, he describes himself as becoming “a transparent eyeball” merged with nature, declaring that “I am nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am part or particle of God” (Emerson, The Complete Essays, 21). These views of Emerson left an indelible mark on Thoreau’s conception of conscience.
As a follower of Emerson and a Transcendentalist, Thoreau also believed that conscience is interconnected with “the Over-Soul,” and that nature is a concrete divine existence communicating with the human spirit. He stated, “Man has a higher nature, namely spirituality or divinity, which can only be attained by suppressing innate emotional desires” (Liu 202–203). How can one awaken this divinity? He proposed a practical approach: “(The young person) goes to the woods at first as a hunter and fisherman, until finally, if there is a seed of a higher life within him, he will recognize his true calling—perhaps as a poet or a naturalist—and lay aside his gun and fishing rod” (Thoreau, Walde, 558). It is clear that retreating to nature is a prerequisite for awakening conscience, and conscience itself is the capacity of individuals to return to their true selves and realize their potential in nature—a form of communication with the cosmos and its spiritual essence beyond all constraints. Thus, Thoreau’s conception of conscience is a value system nurtured through the practice of coexisting with the divine nature of “the Over-Soul” and with nature itself. As evident in his work Walden, Thoreau “frequently compared humans to beasts, arguing that they are barely distinguishable, and that only through conscious self-cultivation can one eliminate bestiality and preserve humanity” (Liu 202). This conscious self-cultivation entails retreating to nature to personally experience its true meaning. He regarded nature as a sanctuary and a sanatorium for purifying the mind and body, calling on humans to draw closer to nature, allowing it to awaken their noble innate conscience; at the same time, he advocated strengthening self-cultivation and engaging in practice to perfect one’s inner morality (Yang and Pu 138–143). As Thoreau made clear in Walden, he believed that politics and rigid social rituals are constraints on individual development; if humans can be content with a simple life, they will have ample time and energy to pursue a richer spiritual life (Qian 79). In Thoreau’s view, drawing close to nature and simplifying life is essentially an awakening of conscience. When people are no longer trapped by secular material desires and learn to listen to the revelations of nature, conscience will naturally arrive like the spring at Walden Pond.
More importantly, Thoreau embraced Emerson’s teaching of following one’s inner will and voice (self-reliance) rather than submitting to social expectations, customs, or the authority of any intermediate institutions, and further translated inner moral conscience into an actionable program for resisting external authority. He explicitly opposed the practice of “limiting the free nature of conscience by any specific and fixed standards” (Ma and Liu 30–32)—these standards refer to externally constructed social authorities that often deprive conscience of independent judgment in the name of collective interests. Thus, Thoreau emphasized that conscience should not be bound by external standards: “He firmly opposed any institutionalized organizations, arguing that individuals should act according to their own consciences rather than laws or regulations” (Zhang 298). All of Thoreau’s political morality was founded on the theoretical premise that “individual conscience is the only true standard for judging what is right and just in politics” (Eulau 510). Thoreau’s refusal to pay the poll tax serves as a prime example. In Civil Disobedience, he argued: “Even if I could trace my dollar to its final use and see it used to buy a man as a slave or a gun to kill someone— the dollar itself being innocent—what concerns me is the consequences of my allegiance to the state. In fact, I have quietly declared war on this state in my own way" (Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, 22). His act of disobedience exemplified listening to the call of inner conscience and rejecting external authority; the “allegiance” he refused was a resistance to a “government of slaves” (Walls 250–251). Thoreau believed that if individuals surrender their conscience to the control of external authorities, they become alienated and lose the ability to think independently and make moral choices. Therefore, he advocated living a life “conforming to a higher law” (Thoreau, Walden, 209), which essentially means that individuals remain uncoerced and unfettered, upholding their independent conscience. Thoreau transformed conscience from a metaphysical moral principle into an active social and political program. He criticized those who obey orders against their own consciences and common sense, arguing that they are no longer complete human beings. Thus, his conception of “conscience” not only demands judging injustice but also requires taking immediate action after judgment, refusing passive compliance. Thoreau’s principle of “civil disobedience,” rooted in his conception of conscience, exerted a profound influence on later political thought and nonviolent resistance movements, inspiring key historical figures such as Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr.
4. Commonalities Between the Two Conceptions of “Innate Conscience”
Though Thoreau, who pursued individual spiritual freedom during the early stages of American industrialization in the 19th century, and Wang Yangming, the culminating figure of the Ming Dynasty’s Philosophy of the Mind, belonged to distinct Eastern and Western cultural contexts, their conceptions of conscience share commonalities in three core dimensions: innateness, the ability to distinguish good from evil, and the necessity of acquired practice.
First, both affirmed the a priori nature of the inherent moral origin, asserting that conscience is inherent in human nature and not dependent on external forces. Wang Yangming defined conscience as “the substance of the mind” (Wang 113), the most fundamental and pure state of the human mind. This ontological status endows conscience with the characteristic of “not requiring external pursuit” (Wang 74)—it is innate in every individual, like a clear mirror capable of reflecting all things. While Thoreau’s articulation of the origin of conscience differs slightly from Wang Yangming’s, their core ideas align. In Thoreau’s view, humans are born with the capacity to establish “an original relation to the universe” (Emerson, The Complete Essays, 412). However, the primacy of efficiency and profit in industrial society, coupled with the rigid mindset of blindly pursuing material comfort, has obscured the innate conscience of human nature like dust. Drawing closer to nature helps individuals escape distractions and reconnect with the voice of their inner conscience. He firmly believed that the essence of conscience is an innate tendency of the individual soul to pursue goodness, which merely requires constant reflection and awareness to awaken its inner power. Clearly, both conceptions anchor the source of conscience within the individual; this internalism regards the mind and the external universe as continuous with each other. By internalizing objective moral standards within the subject, they removed intermediaries from the path to acquiring moral knowledge, transforming moral law into an inherent dimension of the cosmos itself.
Second, both held that conscience enables the distinction between good and evil, and their conceptions of conscience both represent a profound reaction against external authorities and dogmas, rejecting the substitution of individual inner judgment with established rules or the will of others. Wang Yangming explicitly stated, “Knowing good and evil is innate conscience” (Wang 153), emphasizing that conscience is the "mind of right and wrong" (Wang 79)—an inherent moral compass within each individual. Its judgment process does not rely on the guidance of external dogmas, possessing distinct immediacy and spontaneity. Whether upholding moral principles in the face of conflicting interests or adhering to integrity in interpersonal interactions, conscience provides immediate answers without the need for prolonged deliberation. This constitutes a silent refutation of the traditional dogmatic tendency to “replace the mind with ritual” and “determine right and wrong through authority.” Similarly, Thoreau’s understanding of conscience as a capacity for judgment not only aligns closely with Wang Yangming’s but also implicitly critiques the rigid rules and collective authority of industrial society. In Thoreau’s eyes, conscience is the moral perception through which individuals grasp good and evil based on intuitions from the depths of their souls, and this perceptiveness is closely connected to the order of nature—the harmony and justice of nature are directly communicated to the individual’s inner perception, enabling them to distinguish right from wrong without recourse to external dogmas. This is essentially a profound reaction against the monopolization of “the right to define good and evil” by external authorities.
Finally, both embraced a dialectical view that while conscience exists innately, it requires cultivation through practice, emphasizing the subjectivity of moral practice. Wang Yangming distinguished between “innate conscience as inherent substance” and “innate conscience as clear awareness” (Wang 103). The former refers to the innate ontological state of conscience, the moral sense inherent in every individual; the latter, however, requires the elimination of selfish desires such as fame, fortune, and greed through acquired “extending innate conscience” and “reflecting and conquering,” practicing conscience through “tempering in affairs” (Wang 135), and transforming innate conscience from an obscured state to a revealed one. As a Transcendentalist, Thoreau similarly acknowledged this dialectical relationship. He believed that conscience exists innately but needs to be activated through acquired natural experiences and actions, asserting that “every individual’s heart contains a divine principle ... those who pursue spiritual elevation can directly comprehend divine wisdom in nature” (Walls 88)—that is, establishing “an original relation to the universe”. Thus, both agreed that innate conscience serves as the substance, and acquired practice as its function; while acknowledging the innate nature of conscience, they emphasized the necessity of acquired practice, both directing individuals toward the ultimate pursuit of moral self-realization through inner awakening and external practice.
5. Differences Between the Two Conceptions of “Innate Conscience”
Beyond their commonalities, significant differences exist between the two conceptions of conscience. Wang Yangming advocated “tempering in affairs” as the method for practicing conscience, embodying the Confucian ethical responsibility of “cultivating oneself, governing the family, managing the state, and unifying the world” (xiu shen, qi jia, zhi guo, ping tian xia). In contrast, Thoreau adopted nature-based practice as his path, focusing on the individual’s critique of industrial civilization and the construction of an ideal utopia. The following analysis explores the differences between the two conceptions of conscience in terms of practical path and value orientation.
Firstly, in terms of practical path, the two conceptions of “innate conscience” diverge fundamentally from “exile in nature” to “tempering in affairs.” Thoreau advocated self-exile through natural experience, realizing a cycle of “material minimalism—natural experience—spiritual reflection,” stripping away external distractions to achieve the autonomous awakening of conscience. Most importantly, it involves material minimalism and the elimination of dependencies to confront the essence of life. Thoreau abhorred the spiritual alienation caused by material excess in industrial civilization. He sharply criticized the fact that “the mass of men lead lives of quiet desperation” (Thoreau, Walden 24), arguing that people are trapped by various consumer temptations and explicit or implicit social rules, becoming slaves to material possessions while forgetting the meaning of life. To break this alienation, he retreated to Walden Pond, built a cabin with his own hands, grew crops, simplified his life to meet only basic survival needs, and rejected all unnecessary material consumption. As he put it, “The noblest mind is the most self-sufficient” (Thoreau, Walden 144). In his view, this material minimalism was not asceticism but a prerequisite for the awakening of conscience; only by shedding excessive dependence on material possessions could individuals break free from the constraints of social rules and confront the essence of life. His mantra was “Simplify, simplify!” (Thoreau, Walden 101) Next comes natural experience, activating the perception of conscience through physical practice. For Thoreau, nature was not merely an object of appreciation but a field for the practice of conscience. During his retreat, he immersed himself in nature through direct physical engagement. This experience was not merely a superficial connection with nature but a deep interaction that awakened the individual’s perception of their true conscience. Finally comes spiritual reflection, opposing social “alienation” through exile. By actively withdrawing from mainstream society, he criticized industrial civilization and achieved spiritual self-transcendence. In contrast, grounded in Confucian thought, Wang Yangming proposed “the unity of knowledge and action,” advocating practice through “investigating things to extend knowledge” and “tempering in affairs.” Among these, the investigation of things (ge wu) refers to the investigation of things as they manifest in the mind, as they manifest in the will, and as they manifest in innate knowledge (Wang 124); the essence of “investigating things” is not seeking externally but internally, examining one’s own mind. Furthermore, he emphasized that “one must temper oneself in affairs to stand firm” (Wang 78–79), achieving the unity of knowledge and action in specific matters. He opposed empty talk about conscience, arguing that conscience must be forged in daily affairs—whether practicing filial piety and fraternity within the family, handling government affairs in officialdom, or making decisions during rebellions, all of which are arenas for “extending innate conscience.” This “tempering in affairs” involves transforming inner moral judgments into consistent thinking habits through dealing with practical matters, ultimately achieving the state of true “unity of knowledge and action” where “knowledge is the beginning of action, and action is the completion of knowledge” (Wang 5).
Secondly, the value orientations of Thoreau’s and Wang Yangming’s conceptions of “innate conscience” diverge fundamentally: one emphasizes “cultivating oneself, governing the family, managing the state, and unifying the world,” while the other pursues an “individual utopia.” Wang Yangming aimed to practice Confucian ethics and achieve harmony between the individual and society, emphasizing the individual’s responsibility to maintain social order. Rooted in the Confucian ideal of “inner sageliness and outer kingship” (nei sheng wai wang), his conception of conscience held that its significance lies in realizing family harmony, social order, national stability, and ultimately the ideal of great unity (tian xia da tong) through individual moral practice. In his view, the practice of individual conscience is part of one’s responsibility to the family and the nation. As he stated in the Instructions for Practical Living (Chuan Xi Lu), “The learning of the sage is the learning of the mind. Learning consists in striving to fully realize one’s mind, and when one’s mind is fully realized, heavenly principle abides within it” (Wang 248). “Extending this innate conscience means extending the heavenly principle within one’s mind; when the heavenly principle within one’s mind is extended, all things and affairs attain their proper order” (Wang 101). The process of an individual extending their innate conscience is thus a process of aligning “all things and affairs” with heavenly principle, aimed at promoting the prosperity of the family and the nation. In contrast, Thoreau focused on criticizing industrial civilization and constructing an individual utopia, centering on the individual’s autonomous choice of lifestyle. His conception of conscience revolved around how individuals can uphold their true selves in industrial society. Its existential value lies in a critical stance toward industrial civilization, calling for the construction of a utopian lifestyle paradigm that is simple, free, and harmonious with nature—a paradigm where every individual can break away from the social system, live in harmony with nature and themselves, and thereby form an oppression-free ideal society. He questioned the ability of collective revolution to transform society, instead offering a unique approach of “nonviolent reform,” firmly believing that the awakening of individual conscience would trigger a chain reaction. This utopian ideal was essentially a reconstruction of civilization centered on the individual, emphasizing the individual’s autonomous control over their lifestyle.
Conclusion
Within the Confucian framework of “cultivating oneself, governing the family, managing the state, and unifying the world,” Wang Yangming explored the possibility of harmonious coexistence between the individual and society. With “extending innate conscience” as the ideological foundation, he closely integrated the cultivation of the mind with the construction of social order. He argued that every individual possesses an innate conscience that “knows without deliberation” and “acts without learning” (Wang 122), which can be freed from the obscuration of selfish desires through “reflecting and conquering.” This not only enables moral perfection but also promotes family harmony, neighborly harmony, and ultimately social order governed by ritual and law, offering a Chinese solution for achieving social harmony through moral self-discipline. In contrast, Thoreau sought spiritual freedom beyond the constraints of industrial civilization through his engagement with nature. Against the backdrop of the rise of industrial civilization in the 19th century, he took his solitary life at Walden Pond as the arena for practicing conscience, building a cabin, farming his own land, and adopting a minimalist lifestyle to break free from the constraints of materialism and social conditioning, awakening the a clearer sense of life and nurturing an individual utopian ideal of returning to one’s true self through natural experience.
Though rooted in different historical backgrounds and cultural contexts, both conceptions of conscience represent explorations of human nature and the origin of morality. These two forms of moral internalism offer important cross-cultural insights for modern society. Wang Yangming’s “extending innate conscience” and “tempering in affairs” provide a systematic approach for addressing the widespread moral inertia in modern society, promoting the transformation of moral cognition into practical action, helping to bridge the gap between moral awareness and behavior, and emphasizing the achievement of self-perfection through practicing morality in daily life. Thoreau’s advocacy of minimalist living, aimed at reducing material dependence and returning to a more authentic way of living, offers a paradigm for modern individuals to break free from the trap of consumerism; his theory of civil disobedience, which emphasizes the supreme status of individual conscience in the face of authority and power, continues to provide a strong theoretical foundation for nonviolent resistance movements against injustice and oppression in modern society.
Funding
This paper is a phased research output of the Humanities and Social Sciences Research Fund of the Ministry of Education of China entitled “A Study on the Discourse of ‘National Rise’ in American Literature in the Early 20th Century”(Project No.: 23YJA752015) and the Key Project of the Department of Education of Jiangsu Province entitled “Expressions of ‘National Rise’ in American Novels Around World War I”(Project No.: 2023SJZD086). These projects focus on “the relationships between literature, philosophy, and politics,” and this paper constitutes the core theoretical research in this direction.
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The Authors
Zhang Junping, female, Ph.D. in Literature, Professor and Master’s Supervisor at the School of Foreign Studies, Jiangnan University. Her main research fields include literary theory, comparative literature and world literature. She is also an expert on late 19th-and early 20th-century American literature.
Email: jndxzjp@163.com; Tel: +86 18012375575.
Tang Runjia, female, Master’s candidate in English Language and Literature, School of Foreign Studies, Jiangnan University. Her research interests focus on American culture and British and American literature.