A Comparative Study of Wang Yangming’s and Thoreau’s Conceptions of Innate Conscience

Abstract

Wang Yangming’s Philosophy of the Mind and Henry David Thoreau’s Transcendentalist Philosophy are rooted in distinctly different cultural contexts and ideological lineages. Existing academic studies mostly focus on the respective ontological constructions, historical development trajectories, and intellectual influences of these two ideological systems. However, few studies have examined the theoretical convergences between them in the core concept of “innate conscience”—particularly the lack of exploration into their similarities in three key aspects: “affirming the a priori nature of the inherent moral origin,” “criticizing the constraints imposed by external dogmas and authorities,” and “emphasizing the subjectivity of moral practice.” Despite significant philosophical divergences in their conceptions of “innate conscience” regarding metaphysical foundations, methodologies of moral practice, and the boundaries of their engagement with society, both represent a profound reaction against external authorities and dogmas. Moreover, both shift the ultimate source of moral truth from external norms to the individual’s inner mind, thereby constructing a systematic paradigm of moral practice. In light of this, this paper takes the conception of “innate conscience” as the core comparative dimension, adopts cross-cultural comparative research methods, and systematically analyzes the commonalities and differences between the two in three aspects: ideological connotation (the definition of the nature of moral origin), practical path (the specific way of moral realization), and value orientation (the ultimate goal of moral pursuit), aiming to provide a new theoretical perspective for cross-cultural intellectual dialogue.